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RIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT STOCKHOLDER TO RE-
DRESS CORPORATE WRONGS CONSUMMATED
PRIOR TO HIS ACQUISITION OF THE STOCK
This question of rights presents a matter of very great
interest and growing importance in the Federal and State
courts of the United States. With the vast and increasing
proportion of the active business of modern life which is done
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by corporations, it is neither to be wondered at or to be re-
gretted, that the courts of equity should be sought to settle
controversies growing out of the relations between stockhold-
ers and the corporation of which they are members. That
the policy of the law is not set, but is being formulated grad-
ually by adjudications based on experience, necessity and rea-
son, will be realized from an exhaustive search among the
authorities.
There is a direct split of authorities on this question. One
line of decisions follows the lead of Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N. Y.
11, 94 N. E. 1088, holding that "a stockholder may, in the
absence of special circumstances, maintain an action on behalf
of the corporation for the benefit of himself and all other
stockholders, to set aside an improper transaction consum-
mated at the expense of the corporation, although it was com-
pleted before he acquired his stock." In support are Raf-
ferty v. Donnelly, 197 Pa. 423, 47 Atl. 202; Appleton v. Amer-
ican Malting Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 375, 54 Ati. 454; Ramsey v.
Gould, 57 Barb, 398. The special circumstances which these
courts admit will defeat the subsequent stockholder's right to
recover are:
(1) When the suitor is not a bona fide stockholder. For-
rest v. Manchester Ry. Co., 4 De G. F. & J. 126.
(2) When the suitor is guilty of acquiescence in the wrong.
Past v. Beacon Co., 84 Fed. 371.
(3) When the suitor is guilty of laches. Peabody v. Flint,
6 Allen (Mass.) 52.
(4) In cases where the transferee derives his stocks from
one who would have been barred from bringing suit because
of laches or acquiesence. Venner v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 28
Fed. 581; Frooks v. Southwestern Ry. Co., 1 Smale & G. 142.
The other line of decisions, though in the minority, are to
be found in the Federal courts and a number of the state
courts. The Federal equity rule promulgated by the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1882 and numbered 94 (now 27) is in sub-
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stance, "that to entitle one to attack a fraudulent trans-
action or wrong on the part of the corporation, it must appear
that one was a stockholder at the time of the commission of
the act complained of, or that his shares have devolved on
him by operation of law." The court in deciding Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, one year before the Federal rule was
promulgated, assumed this position, and never, in a single
instance has the decision of Hawes v. Oakland been deviated
from in the Federal court. There are numerous cases where
it has been sustained. United Electric Sec. Co. v. La. Elec.
L. Co., 68 Fed. 673: Church v. Citizen's Street R. Co., 78 Fed.
526; Dimpfell v. Ohio M. R. Co., 110 U. S. 209; Taylor v.
Holmes, 127 U. S. 489. It is argued by the proponents of
Pollitz v. Gould supra, that the Federal rule is a matter of
procedure and not of substantive law, and in Just v. Idaho
Canal Co., 16 Ida. 639, 102 Pac. 381, it was said: "It is a
rule that has been adopted for the purpose of preventing a
transfer of stock to a non-resident, in order to enable him
to bring the case in the Federal court. It is a rule of practice
instead of a principle of law, and is not applicable in state
courts." But the Federal courts and some state courts have
denied that this is a rule of procedure and have accepted the
reasoning of Pardee, C. J., in United Elec. Sec. Co. v. La. Elec.
L. Co., supra, that "as a general proposition, the purchaser
of stocks in a corporation is not allowed to attack the acts
and management of the corporation prior to the acquisition
of his stocks; otherwise we might have a case where the stock
duly represented in a corporation consented to and partici-
pated in bad management and waste, and after reaping the
benefits from such a transaction could easily be passed into
the hands of a subsequent purchaser, who could make his
harvest by appearing and contesting the very acts and con-
duct which his vendor had consented to." The rule must be
accepted as something more than a rule of practice to prevent
fraud and collusion to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal
court.
Passing from the Federal authorities sustaining this
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proposition we come to the state courts which are in accord.
Perhaps the leading case on this question is Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb., 644, 93 N. W. 1024, which was decided
in 1903 by Commissioner Pound, who is at the present time
Dean of the Harvard Law School. The case is one in which
the present stockholders who are maintaining an action in the
name of the corporation are all subsequent purchasers, having
obtained their stocks through the defendant, whom they are
now suing for fraud on the corporation prior to their acquisi-
tion of the stocks. Pound, C., in holding that a present stock-
holder should not be allowed to sue for mismanagement prior
to his purchase unless its effects are of a continuing nature and
injurious to the purchaser, says of the particular case, "the
present stockholders are contesting acts through which they
got title to a large portion of their stocks, and acts which
those through whom they derived the greater part of the
remainder could not have challenged because they partici-
pated therein, and by contesting these acts which did not
injure any of the present stockholders in the least, are seeking
to recover back a large portion of the purchase price of the
stock which was admittedly worth all they paid for it." It
would appear from this case and others in accord, that the
transferee of stocks acquires no greater rights by his pur-
chase than his vendor had; Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14,
holding that the assignee of shares of stock in a corporation
acquires no greater rights than his assignor's, as he holds by
the same title and is subject to the same liabilities." Accord
McCampbell v. Railroad, 111 Tenn. 55; Matter of Appl'n of
Syn. C & N. Y. R. R. Co., 91 N. Y. 1; Graham v. Railroad Co.,
102 U. S. 148; Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. 481; Upton v.
Basset, Eliz., 445; and Schilling & Schneider Brewing Co. v.
Schneider, 110 Mo. 83, where the stocks devolved upon the
complainant by operation of law.
As to the subsequent stockholder's right to sue when the
wrong is of a continuing nature, see Hymans v. Old Domin-
ion Co. 1 Me. 294, L. R. A. 1915 D 1128.
But there are a number of cases in different jurisdictions
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that follow the Federal rule and are of the opinion that the
transferee's inability to sue for mismanagement is not de.
pendent entirely upon the fact that his vendor could not have
sued for mismanagement because of participation in such
acts, but that the transferee has received all he bargained
and paid for and that it would be inequitable to allow him to
set aside former transaction and thereby increase the value
of his stocks. Clark v. American Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436:
"What he paid for and what he received was based on a
portion not affected by the fraud consummated prior to
his acquisition of the stock." Alexander Trus. v. Searcy, 81
Ga., 536-550: "The weight of authority seems to be that a
person who did not own stock at the time of transaction con-
plained of cannot complain or bring suit to have them declared
illegal." Cited and approved in Hawes v. Oakland, supra, and
Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., supra. To the same effect
Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo, 253-259.
That the law on this subject is unsettled appears from th,
conflict of opinions and authorities and it is difficult to predict
which line of cases will ultimately be accepted as authority.
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